EX PARTE OR LATE FILED

1401 H Street, N.W. Suite 1020 Washington, D.C. 20005 Office 202/326-3822



DOCKET FILE COPY ORIGINAL

Anthony M. Alessi Director Federal Relations

December 13, 1994

PECEIVED

1 DEC 1 3 1994

PAUL RECOMMENDATIONS TO SERVE OF SECTION

Mr. William F. Caton Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, NW Room 222 Washington, DC 20554

Re:

M Allessi

Ex Parte Statement Docket No. 94-1

Dear Mr. Caton:

On December 12, 1994, Mr. Pablo Spiller, Professor of Business and Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, Mr. Daniel Fling - Director, Federal Regulatory Policy of Ameritech and I met with Mr. James Coltharp, Special Advisor to Commissioner Barrett, to discuss our position in the above referenced proceeding. The attached material was used as the basis for our discussion.

Sincerely,

Attachment / cc: J. Coltharp

No. of Copies rec'd Oda List A B C D E

INCENTIVE REGULATION AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT BY LECS

by

SHANE GREENSTEIN
University of Illinois
SUSAN MCMASTER
University of Illinois
and
PABLO T. SPILLER
University of California, and LECG



THE ISSUE

- WHO WILL BUILD THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY?
- KEY ROLE OF LECS
- DOES REGULATION INFLUENCE INVESTMENT?

OVERVIEW

- EMPIRICAL
- LEC SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON

REGULATION

DEPLOYMENT OF FIBER OPTIC & COMPLEMENTARY TECHNOLOGIES

BUSINESS & DEMOGRAPHIC

ALTERNATIVE ECONOMETRIC MODELS

DATA

PANEL DATA

LEC TERRITORY WITHIN A STATE

101 LECS PER YEAR (1986/91)

ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES:

FIBER OPTIC CABLE (1986/91)

ISDN LINES, SS7, DSPC SWITCHES (89/91)

DATA

REGULATORY VARIABLES, LEC SPECIFIC

PRICE REGULATION
PRICE CAP
PRICE FREEZE

EARNINGS SHARING

OTHER VARIABLES MEASURING ENTRY BYPASS COMPETITION RESTRICTIONS

DATA

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES, LEC SPECIFIC:

LAND AREA
POPULATION (URBAN/RURAL)
PER-CAPITA INCOME
MANUFACTURING, FIRE INCOME
CONSTRUCTION WAGES

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES, GENERAL

NUMBER OF LECS IN STATE
YEAR AND LEC TYPE DUMMY VARIABLES

RESULTS

DIFFERENT ESTIMATION METHODS

PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL BASELINE GROWTH MODEL

- PRICE REGULATION HAS STATISTIC AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE ON DEPLOYMENT OF FIBER, SS7 AND ISDN
- EARNINGS SHARING DOES NOT

RESULTS

COUNTERFACTUAL

SAMPLE

LECS WITH NO INCENTIVE REGULATION AS OF 1991

METHOD

IMPOSE ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF INCENTIVE SCHEMES

RESULTS

FIBER

	PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT	BASELINE GROWTH
PRICE REG	80%	130%
PRICE REG & E.S.	40%	55%
EARNINGS SHARING	30%	-50%

OVERVIEW: MAIN RESULTS

- INCENTIVE REGULATION STRONGLY INFLUENCES DEPLOYMENT PRICE REGULATION PROVIDES STRONG INCENTIVES EARNINGS SHARING DOES NOT PRICE REG. AND E.S. COMBINED PROVIDE LITTLE INCENTIVES
- DEMOGRAPHICS ARE IMPORTANT
- RBOCS ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN ANYBODY ELSE

FINAL COMMENTS

- PRICE INCENTIVES MATTER
- ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY STRUCTURES HAVE DIFFERENT DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS
- SIMPLE REGULATORY STRUCTURES ARE SUPERIOR